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The NORJAK Time Table
What Happened and When Did it Happen?
This is a table of actions occurring throughout the NORJAK incident. In the past it has been difficult for researchers to gain an understanding of the “order of occurrence” of NORJAK events because the events are frequently described in different documents. Each action and the time it occurred have been derived from reliable sources (mostly documents released by the FBI). The purpose of this time-table is to aid the researcher in understanding the “order of occurrence” of events. If you have questions or comments about this Time-table, e-mail Sluggo at Sluggo@N467US.com.
Explanation of Time-table columns:
Time –The time (or time range) at which the action occurred. If the text in this column is [GREEN] , the time value is of the highest order of reliability. If the text in this column is [BLUE], the time value is of questionable reliability. If the text in this column is [RED], the time value is an estimate based on the opinion of individuals familiar with the case. Times are either Pacific Standard Time (PST) in 24-hour format such as “15:53 PST”, or Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), sometimes called Zulu Time in 24-hour format such as “23:53 UTC” or “23:53 z”. PST = UTC minus 8 hours (i.e. 23:53 z = 15:53 PST).
Action – The information in this column is a description of an event that occurred during the commission of the crime. If the text in this column is [BLUE], it is text that has been added for clarity.
Actionee - The individual (or individuals) involved in the action. If the text in this column is [GREEN], the identification of the individual is of the highest order of reliability. If the text in this column is [BLUE], the identification of the individual is of questionable reliability. If the text in this column is [RED], the identification of the individual is a “best guess” based on the opinion of individuals familiar with the case.
Comment(s) – Additional or modifying information about this entry. If the text in this column is [GREEN], the information is of the highest order of reliability. If the text in this column is [BLUE], the information is of questionable reliability. If the text in this column is [RED], the information is a “best guess” based on the opinion of individuals familiar with the case.
Principle Individuals and Agencies:
|
|
|
Cooper = Hijacker, Dan (D B) Cooper |
|
Flo = Flight Attendant
|
|
Flt-Ops KC =
NWA Flight Operations in Unknown Location (possibly |
|
Flt-Ops MSP =
NWA Flight Operations in |
|
|
|
Harold = Flight Engineer Harold E. Anderson |
|
OAK CNTR = |
|
Pilot = Either the Pilot, First Officer, or Flight Engineer of Flt 305 (Used when absolute ID is unknown) |
|
Raz = William Rataczak First Officer |
|
Rescue 50983 =
A Lockheed HC-130 out of Hamilton Air Force Base, |
|
RNO TWR = |
|
Scott = Captain William Scott Pilot In Command (PIC) |
|
SEA App Con = SEA Approach Control |
|
SEA CNTR = |
|
SEA GRND = SEA Ground Control (ATC) |
|
SEA TWR – SEA Control Tower (ATC) |
|
Tina = Flight Attendant Tina Mucklow |
|
Time-Table Beginning On 11/24/1971 at 14:00 PST |
|||
|
Time |
Action |
Actionee |
Comment(s) |
|
14:00 PST |
Dan Cooper purchases a
ticket to SEA at PDX |
Cooper |
FBI
interrogation of Ticket Agent |
|
14:53 –
14:58 PST |
Flt 305 Wheels Off at PDX. |
Pilot |
Derived from
Com with Flt-Ops at 15:07 PST. |
|
14:59 PST |
Cooper hands note to
Schaffner |
Cooper |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.4 |
|
15:02 PST |
Schaffner takes note to
cockpit. |
Flo |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.4 Time on note is 22:02 z but in obviously
in error to lack of congruency with bounding times. |
|
15:07 PST |
Flt 305 reports
“Wheels Off” @ PDX Estimated time of arrival at SEA 15:36 PST. |
Pilot |
Comm.
with NWA Flt-Ops KC. |
|
15:10 PST |
Cooper informs crew he
wants the money in negotiable currency to be passed to a crew member. |
Cooper |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.4 |
|
15:13 PST |
Flt 305 reports Passenger
is hijacking, has bomb in briefcase, wants $200K by 5:PM
Seattle. (17:00 PST) |
Pilot |
Comm.
with NWA Flt-Ops KC. |
|
15:20 PST |
Cooper informs crew that
he wants everything ready before landing. |
|
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.4 |
|
15:25 PST |
Cooper informs crew that
he wants to hold out without passengers knowing [about the hijacking] if
possible |
Cooper |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:26 PST |
Cooper informs crew that
he will let all passengers go as soon as the plane is refueled |
Cooper |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:26 PST |
Flt 305 advises
Approaching LOFAL
Fix |
Pilot |
Comm.
with NWA Flt-Ops KC. LOFAL
Fix is over the |
|
15:30 PST |
Flt 305 holding NW of SEA
@ 6000 ft. with 18000 lbs of fuel remaining |
Pilot |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:26 –
16:11 PST |
Flt 305 establishes a
holding pattern NE of SEA at 6000 ft. MSL and 15 – 20 NM out along the
307º radial of the SEA
VORTAC. Early in this period they reported lo visibility and
icing conditions. Late in this period they reported improved visibility with
scattered clouds at 5000 to 5500 feet. They later asked to go out to 30 NM
DME a on the same radial to avoid rain. At some point during this period SEA
App Con became aware of the hijacking. Probably after 15:58. |
Pilot &
SEA App Con |
Comm. with SEA
App Con |
|
16:11 –
17:05 PST |
Flt 305 continued in the above pattern. |
Pilot &
SEA App Con |
Comm. with SEA
App Con |
|
15:43 PST |
Pilot received a call from
NWA, they are standing by |
Pilot |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:45 PST |
Unclear note in
handwritten log may say: Sent log to Flt-Ops MSP. |
Pilot |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:45 PST |
Tina called cockpit and
requested that another girl be allowed to stay with him. Cooper said,
“No” |
Pilot |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.5 |
|
15:58 PST |
Flt 305 advises they did
not inform ATC of the hijacking |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
15:59 PST |
Suggest Flt 305 squawk
3100 (Transponder Code). [This
is odd because ATC assigns Squawk codes, not Flt-Ops.] Flt 305 indicates they will do so. |
Flt-Ops MSP
& Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
16:00 PST |
Pilot makes PA announcement
to passengers; “Having slight mechanical difficulties. Will burn off
fuel and be landing in 13 to 18 minutes. |
Pilot |
Time based on handwritten crew notes p.6 and p. 12 |
|
16:51 PST |
President of NWA advises
all LE to take no action. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
16:55 PST |
Flt 305 advises they will
make approach to landing at this time. |
Pilot |
Comm. with |
|
17:05 PST |
Flt 305 begins approach to
landing at SEA. |
Pilot |
|
|
17:05 – 17:41
PST |
Flt 305 has an uneventful
approach to SEA Runway 16 R. |
Pilot
& SEA App Con |
Comm. with SEA
App Con |
|
17:37 PST |
Flt 305 advises they are 5
NM out on final approach |
Pilot |
Comm. with |
|
17:40 PST |
Flt 305 begins comm. with SEA
TWR |
Pilot &
SEA TWR |
Comm. with SEA
TWR |
|
17:43 PST |
Flt 305 “Wheels
Down: at SEA |
Pilot &
SEA GRND |
Comm. with SEA
GRND |
|
17:43 PST |
Flt 305 begins comm. with
SEA GRND |
Pilot &
SEA GRND |
Comm. with SEA
GRND |
|
17:43 –
17:59 PST |
Early in this period Flt
305 reports Cooper in lavatory. Passengers are unloaded and fueling of the
aircraft begins. |
Pilot, SEA GRND |
Comm. with SEA
GRND |
|
15:59 –
18:59 PST |
The transcripts do not
have “Time Stamps” for this period, so all information from this
period is presented together. During this 1 hour period there was a lot of
communication with SEA GRND and others who were involved with the refueling,
exchange (release) of passengers, exchange of parachutes and exchange of the
ransom money. The salient points are: There
was difficulty with the first fuel truck, it was
unable to pump fuel into the plane. There were some problems managing the
passengers after they were removed from the plane but before they were
transported away. |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #4 |
|
(cont.) 15:59 –
18:59 PST |
Very
early in this period Flt 305 was instructed on what to do when the hijacker
bails out. They were told to Squawk 7700 [the transponder code for emergency]
for 30 seconds at blink all aircraft lights. The Pilot relayed to SEA GRND
Tina’s description of the explosive device. It was; “dynamite
sticks and the battery and wires in his briefcase. The three male members of
the crew tried to figure a way to get Tina up with them so they could all
leave out the front stairs, but were unable and would not abandon her. |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #4 |
|
(cont.) 15:59 –
18:59 PST |
During this period a plane
started taxing along the taxiway and was unaware the airport was closed. Flo
and Alice were in a car and thought that if Cooper was told everything was
going well he would let Tina go. Tena had been instructed to sit with Cooper
and not go forward of the 1st Class Section. |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #4 |
|
17:47 PST |
Flt 305 reports Cooper in
lavatory |
|
|
|
18: 21 PST |
Cooper gives demands: |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:21 PST |
Flt-Ops MSP advises cannot
make |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Pilot |
|
18:21 PST |
Cooper continues demands:
Aft door will be open an remain so, stairs will be lowered after take-off, |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:21 PST |
Flt-Ops MSP advises that
even with aft stairs up, 305 can’t make Mexican border. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Pilot |
|
18:21 PST |
Flt 305 advises the Flight
Attendants aren’t off yet. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:21 PST |
Flt-Ops MSP advises that
the aircraft is operable with the aft stairs extended. Just can’t make
it with flaps down. Can go maybe 2 to 2½ hours. That would get you to
Frisco. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Pilot |
|
18:21 PST |
Flt 305 advises they will
talk with Cooper again |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:25 PST |
Crew advised Cooper of
range limitations. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:25 PST |
Cooper indicated he will
accept their word and asked if they could make |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:25 PST |
Flt-Ops
MSP advises they are checking on |
Flt-Ops MSN |
Comm. of
Flt-Ops MSP with Pilot |
|
18:25 PST |
Flt-Ops MSN
says “Ability to jump out of a 707 with a
parachute is nil” [Assumption is he meant 727] |
Flt-Ops MSN |
Comm. of
Flt-Ops MSP with Pilot |
|
18:25 PST |
Pilot
indicates he will talk again with Cooper |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:38 PST |
Flt 305 advises that they
have negotiated the roles of… 2 girls leaving any moment 3rd
girl to stay with aircraft. He wants her to manipulate the stairs for him
after the plane is airborne. Have tried to tell him I am unable to operate
the stairs to lowered after takeoff… Trying to
get him to lower stairs partially for takeoff. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:38 PST |
Flt Ops MSP says the do
not know of a way to lock stairs partially open. |
Flt-Ops MSN |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:40 PST |
Flt 305 reads proposed
procedure and questions if a 20 degree opening is enough for Cooper to get
out |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:40 PST |
Flt Ops MSP tells Flt 305
to allow Cooper to escape: slow to Emergency Approach to Landing Speed,
extend stairs, try with gear up and gear down. His weight should open enough
for Cooper to escape. |
Flt-Ops MSN |
Comm. with
Pilot |
|
18:44 PST |
Flo and Alice leave
aircraft |
Pilot Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:59 PST |
Several exchanges with Flt
Ops MSP. Discussions about flight characteristics with Aft Stairs extended.
Refueling is still in progress and the whole crew is in the cockpit. Flt 305 ask if Tina should have a lanyard if she is going to help
him close the door. Flt Ops MSP says; “Yes” |
Pilot and
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. between
Flt 305 and Flt-Ops MSP |
|
18:59 to 19:41
PST |
The transcripts do not
have “Time Stamps” for this period, so all information from this
period is presented together. Here are the salient points for this 42 minute
period: SEA GRND asked Flt 305 to
confirm that there was only one individual involved. There was a message sent
to Flt 305 from the FAA Chief Psychiatrist indicating the
it was felt that the second parachute was for the stewardess and
Cooper would blow up the plane after he leaves. The Flight Crew confirmed
that Cooper didn’t want anyone in the aisle of aft of the first class
curtain and would only deal with Tina. The pilots have never left the
cockpit. |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #5 |
|
(cont.) 18:59 to 19:41
PST |
Boeing sent instructions
of how to evacuate the aircraft from the front. SEA GRND instructed Flt
305 to continue to squawk 3100 until told to change by departure control or
center. Flt 305 was relieved of
many restrictions established for air traffic control and noise abatement.
They were cleared to climb immediately to 10,000 feet, though they did not. |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #5 |
|
(cont.) 18:59 to 19:41
PST |
Flt 305 was routed down
V-23 by ATC based on terrain clearance at 10,000 feet. Flt 305 was informed that
“there will be people with you all the way down, so if you go above
10,000 feet let us know.” [This is reference to chase planes.] Flt 305
was cleared down V-23 all the way to |
Pilot and SEA
GRND |
Comm. between
Pilot and SEA GRND Reel #5 |
|
19:01 PST |
Difficulty with one of the
fuel trucks. Only 24, 000 lbs Fuel on board. Attempting to fuel with 3rd
truck. |
Pilot and Flt-Ops
MSP |
Comm. between
Flt 305 and Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:05 PST |
Flt Ops MSP sends
preliminary range info. SEA to |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. between
Flt 305 and Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:22 PST |
Flt 305 confirms that
based on the range limitations |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:22 PST |
Flt-Ops
MSP indicated that next stop will be a leg of about the same distance and
gives VOR info for navigation to |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:22 PST |
Flt 305
advises that fuel truck has left, air stairs have been removed, forward door
is closed, and Cooper has agreed to let them take off with the aft door fully
closed. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:22 PST |
Cooper says; “Get
the plane on the road”. |
Cooper |
Comm. with
Pilot |
|
19:25 PST |
Flt 305 says SEA GRND
advises that the Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude to |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:25 PST |
Flt 305 suggest
they go along the coast and then back on the route. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:25 PST |
Flt-Ops
MSP advises that aft stairs will have to be retracted before landing or the
damage would prevent subsequent takeoff. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:25 PST |
Flt 305 is positioning for
take off. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:33 PST |
Flt 305 takes off |
None |
Estimated based
on next transmission. |
|
19:37 PST |
SEA CNTR request Flt 305
ident. [this
is a process of making sure ATC is tracking the right “Blip” on
their radar]. And verify assigned
altitude of 10,000 ft. |
SEA CNTR |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:40 PST |
Flt 305 reports through
6500 ft. and trying to get the steps down back there |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:40 PST |
Flt 305 reports leveling
off at 7,000 ft. Cooper wants the stairs down and they are slowing to about
160 KIAS. |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:42 PST |
Flt 305 reports “14
NM out of SEA on Victor-23. Cooper is trying to get the door down, Stew is
with us, he cannot get the stairs down. We now have
an aft stair light on. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:44 PST |
Flt 305 advises they will
hold at 7,000 ft. We have the back steps down now and it looks like we
aren’t going to be able to climb anymore. |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:45 PST |
Flt 305 reports 19 NM DME
out of SEA at 7,000 ft. No comm.. with
Cooper but have an aft stair light. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:45 PST |
Fly Ops MSP advises that
after a while someone will have to go back and take a look to see if he is
out of the aircraft. Also, if they have to go any distance in that
configuration their indicated optimum speed is 170 knots. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:46 PST |
|
|
Comm. between
Flt-Ops MSP and |
|
19:48 PST |
Flt 305 reports 160 KIAS,
which is about 5 knots above stall speed. Holding at 7,000 ft. Fuel flow is
4500 gal/hr. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:48 PST |
Flt Ops MSP advises they
will not make it to |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:48 PST |
Flt 305 reports Flaps to
15 degrees and beginning climb to 10,000 |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:51 PST |
Flt 305 advises they are
climbing to 10,000 ft. and are through 9,000 ft now. |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:53 PST |
Flt 305 reports level at
10,000 ft. with 170 – 180 KIAS |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
19:54 PST |
Flt Ops MSP tells Flt 305;
“as soon as you are reasonably sure Cooper has left, the sooner you can
land. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:54 PST |
Flt 305 reports: Miss
Mucklow said he apparently has the knapsack around him and [she] thinks he will jump. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:54 PST |
Flt Ops MSP advised that
they have a direct phone patch hooked up on 131.8 MHz. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
19:57 PST |
Tina describes the
briefcase as containing (in the left
corner) had 8 sticks of dynamite
about 6 inches long and 1 inch in diameter, two rows of them, Then a wire out
of there, then a battery like a flashlight battery only as thick as my arm
and 8 inches long. |
Tina |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:01 PST |
Flt Ops MSP inquires about
altitude |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
20:01 PST |
305 advises that altitude
is 15,000 ft.,[assumed to
be nervous error due to context] 160
KIAS, Fuel Flow 4000 gal/hr, 15 degrees flaps, Gear down. Will stay at 10,000
ft. until he has left. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:02 PST |
Flt Ops MSP advises: No
terrain exceeds 8,000 ft. on that route [V-23] Then you will have
to go to 10,500 or 11,000 between Red Bluff and |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
20:03 PST |
Flt 305 reports Total Air
Temperature (TAT) as -7 Degrees Centigrade. [TAT is the same as Outside Air Temperature] |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:05 PST |
Pilot reports that he has tried
twice to contact Cooper unsuccessfully, then he came
on the PA system and said everything is OK. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:06 PST |
Flt Ops MSP advises that |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
20:09 PST |
Flt 305 advises that CHK?
Manuals do not have |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:09 PST |
Will have it for you [will guide them through the Medford Approach
procedure]. If we have a comm. problem
the tower will guide you through it. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
20:10 PST |
|
|
Comm. between Flt-Ops
MSP and |
|
20:10 PST |
Flt 305 indicated they
have found the Medford Approach Plates. |
Pilot |
Comm. between
Flt 305, Flt-Ops MSP and |
|
20:11 PST |
This is the time
that is generally used to mark Cooper’s jump point. It differs from the
next entry by 1 minute because the transmissions were being listened to and
then entered into the TTY creating a 1 minute delay. |
None |
None |
|
20:12 PST |
Flt 305
advises they are getting some oscillations in the cabin,
Cooper must be doing something with the stairs. |
Pilot |
Comm. with
Flt-Ops MSP |
|
20:15 |
SEA CNTR
advises Portland Altimeter (Corresponding Sea Level Barometric Pressure) is
30.03 inches of Hg. [This is
important because it shows that at 20:15:56 they were very near |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
20:20 PST |
Flt Ops
MSP request Go to 131.8 MHz. |
Flt-Ops MSP |
Attempted
Comm. with Flt 305 |
|
20:20 PST |
|
|
Comm. between
Flt-Ops MSP and |
|
20:20 PST |
Flt Ops
MSP Advises we are on the phone and will be talking with him shortly. |
|
Comm. between
Flt-Ops MSP and |
|
20:33 PST |
Flt 305
reports still at 10,000 ft. |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
20:33 to 21:43
PST |
This
period is uneventful. Comms. consists
of Radar Station hand-offs, altimeter settings etc, The last altimeter
setting was at |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
21:43 PST |
Flt 305
request altitude change to 11,000 ft. |
Pilot |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
21:44 PST |
Handoff from
SEA CNTR to OAK CNTR |
SEA CNTR |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
21:45 PST |
Flt 305
is out of 10,000 ft> climbing slowly to 11,000 ft is one mile south of |
SEA CNTR |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
21:45 PST |
Radar contact with Northwest 305. |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. with SEA
CNTR |
|
21:46 PST |
Flt 305
reports out of 10,700 ft. climbing to 11,000 ft. |
Pilot |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
21:46 PST |
Flt 305
requested vectors direct to Red Bluff and Direct to |
Pilot |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
21:47 PST |
OAK CNTR
broadcast on 306.9 MHz [a
military frequency]
asking Flt 305 for a radio check. Then explained to
Rescue 50983 that Flt 305 could not monitor the military frequency and ask Rescue
983 if he could transmit on 360.9MHz and monitor 120.4 MHz |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. with
Rescue 50983 |
|
21:53 PST |
OAK CNTR
is vectoring the C-130 to intercept Flt 305. At this point they are 10 miles
apart and Flt 305 is level at 11,000 and 50 NM out of Red Bluff on V-23 |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
22:05 PST |
Flt 305
is 10 NM NW of Red Bluff on a heading of 090 degrees (East). |
Pilot |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
22:11 PST |
Flt 305
is over Red Bluff turning to |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. between OAK
CNTR radar positions |
|
22:14 PST |
Flt 305
request slow turns and slow descent |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:33 PST |
There is
an attempt to Hand-off Flt 305 to RNO TWR. The attempt fails and RNO TWR is
informed that there is a flight “In Trail” with Flt 305. OAK CNTR
confirms that Flt 305 is squawking 3100 and ID’s
the flight in trail as a C-130. |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:34 PST |
RNO TWR
makes radar contact with Flt 305. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with OAK
CNTR |
|
22:34 PST |
OAK CNTR
confirms that Flt 305 is 42 NM WNW of |
OAK CNTR |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:35 PST |
RNO TWR
gives Flt 305 landing instructions to intercept the Instrument Landing System
(ILS) outer marker, altimeter, wind conditions, and to expect a lower
altitude [assignment] in 20 NM. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
22:35 PST |
Flt 305 advises
that they are trying to contact Cooper and are going to try to get the aft
stairs up before landing, so they may need to “break off” the
approach at some time. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:43 PST |
Flt 305
reports that they have not been able to contact Cooper, the stairs are still
down, they may decide to go ahead and land with them down, which will create
some sparks. They are at 8,200 ft. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:44 PST |
Flt 305 is
given instructions for where to circle if they need to. They should maintain
8,500 ft. on the circle. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
22:46 PST |
As Flt
305 approaches the ILS marker they declare their intention to continue to
landing. [However, they continued
to circle] |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:48 PST |
Flt 305
advises that they can’t seem to raise Cooper. If he’s there they
would just as soon land with the stairs hanging. The stair isn’t all
the way down and probably doesn’t have any pressure on it. They ask
where to taxi on landing. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:49 PST |
Flt 305
expresses that they do not want to park anywhere near an occupied building in
case the bomb goes off. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:52 PST |
Flt 305
indicates that they will probably make one more circle and then come in. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:55 PST |
Flt 305
is cleared for the alpha ILS approach while 3NM from the |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
22:57 PST |
Flt 305
once again reiterates that they have made no contact with Cooper and are
landing with the aft stair down |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
22:57 PST |
RNO TWR
offers to have the emergency equipment follow them down the runway, but they
refuse stating that they do not want any flashing lights. They want the
landing to be treated as normal in every respect. |
RNO TWR and
Pilot |
Comms.
between RNO TWR and Pilot. |
|
22:58 PST |
Flt 305
is issued landing clearance. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
23:02 PST |
Flt 305
is wheels down |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:03 to 23:08
PST |
During
this time period Flt 305 taxies to a place on the ramp away from the
terminal. There is a discussion about sparks on landing from the stair being down, the tower only saw sparks when they were at taxi
speed. At this time they are still planning to take on fuel. |
RNO TWR and
Pilot |
Comms.
between RNO TWR and Pilot |
|
23:08 |
Flt 305
indicates they are going to take a look in the back. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:09 to 23:13
PST |
Flt 305
is looking into the back |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:13 PST |
Tower
advises Flt 305 to: Not touch anything aboard the aircraft and exit the front . This message is not received by Flt 305. This
request was repeated several times. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
23:13 PST |
Flt 305
advises that Cooper left the plane somewhere between SEA and |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:14 PST |
Flt 305
has once again been requested to leavbe by the
front, they advise that they have no front stairs and would prefer not to
have anyone approach the aircraft. They will exit the rear and wait at the
front of the plane. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:14 PST |
RNO TWR ask when was the last time they saw Cooper. |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
|
23:14 PST |
Flt 305
responds that they have been instructed by NWA management not to answer any
questions at this time. |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:20 PST |
Flt 305
advises that they have an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) running and would like a
ground generator or a fire-watch. Also that the FBI is on board the aircraft |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:22 PST |
Flt 305
final transmission is “Good Night” |
Pilot |
Comm. with RNO
TWR |
|
23:22 PST |
RNO TWR
final transmission is “Good Night” |
RNO TWR |
Comm. with Flt
305 |
This page was last revised: March 13, 2009.